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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20251208T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20251208T143000
DTSTAMP:20260627T151343
CREATED:20250821T122111Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250822T104814Z
UID:990000519-1765189800-1765204200@cgde-home.de
SUMMARY:Microeconomics II
DESCRIPTION:Course type\nIWH-DPE Foundation Course\, CGDE First-year Course \nLecturers\nDennis Hutschenreiter\, PhD (IWH) and Professor Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch\, PhD (Leipzig University – starting in October 2025) \nSummary\nThis is the second course of the first-year triple sequence in Microeconomics. \nThe first half of the course introduces fundamental concepts in noncooperative game theory. Students learn to model and analyse strategic situations in static\, dynamic\, and incomplete information settings\, with applications across economics\, finance\, and related fields. Topics include core solution concepts\, equilibrium refinements\, and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. \nIn the second half\, students will learn about two main areas of applications of mechanism design and game theory\, respectively\, namely auctions and bargaining. With auctions\, the course will introduce the main auction formats and their theoretical properties for the case of independent private values\, as well as general theoretical results (revelation principle\, revenue equivalence\, optimal auctions). Additional issues under common values\, as well as selected applications and recent developments will be presented. With bargaining\, the course will introduce both the cooperative/axiomatic and non-cooperative/strategic approach to bargaining\, and the fundamental results under each approach for the case of complete information. Additional issues and approaches for incomplete-information bargaining\, as well as selected applications and recent developments will be presented. An important element of the first part\, with both auctions and bargaining\, will be related experiments (approaches and evidence)\, including classroom experiments. \nSchedule\n08.12.2025          10:30-12:00 and 13:00-14:30      IWH\, Leipziger Str. 100\, 3rd floor\, Conference Room\n12.01.2026          10:30-12:00 and 13:00-14:30      IWH\, Leipziger Str. 100\, 3rd floor\, Conference Room\n26.01.2026          10:30-12:00 and 13:00-14:30      IWH\, Leipziger Str. 100\, 3rd floor\, Conference Room\n09.02.2026          10:30-12:00 and 13:00-14:30      IWH\, Leipziger Str. 100\, 3rd floor\, Conference Room \nContent\n\nGames in Normal Form\nGames in Extensive Form\nGames with Incomplete Information\nAuctions\nBargaining\nExperiments\n\nCourse requirements\nAttendance at all lectures is mandatory and a prerequisite to submit solutions for the assignments. \nFollowing each session\, students will receive a problem set which they need to solve within two weeks. Course completion requires passing a minimum of three out of four assignments. \nRequired Reading\n1. Games in Normal Form \nMas-Colell\, A.\, Whinston\, M. D. & Green\, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 7 and 8. \nOsborne\, M.J. & Rubinstein\, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. 1st Edition. MIT Press. \n2. Games in Extensive Form \nMas-Colell\, A.\, Whinston\, M. D. & Green\, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 9. \nOsborne\, M.J. & Rubinstein\, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. 1st Edition. MIT Press. \n3. Games with Incomplete Information \nMas-Colell\, A.\, Whinston\, M. D. & Green\, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8.E. \nOsborne\, M.J. & Rubinstein\, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. 1st Edition. MIT Press. \n4. Auctions \nBreitmoser\, Y. & Schweighofer-Kodritsch\, S. (2022). Obviousness around the clock. Experimental Economics\, 25(2)\, 483-513. \nKagel\, J. H. & Levin\, D. (2015). Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics Volume 2\, edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth\, Princeton University Press. Chapter 9\, 563–637. \nKrishna\, V. (2010). Auction Theory. 2nd Edition. Elsevier. Chapters 1-6. \n5. Bargaining \nKim\, J.\, Lim\, W. & Schweighofer-Kodritsch\, S. (2024). Patience is power: Bargaining and payoff delay. Mimeo. \nOsborne\, M. & Rubinstein\, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press. Chapters 1-5. \nRoth\, A. E. (1995). Bargaining Experiments. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics\, edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth\, Princeton University Press\, Chapter 4\, 253–348. \nSchweighofer‐Kodritsch\, S. (2018). Time preferences and bargaining. Econometrica\, 86(1)\, 173-217. \nSchweighofer-Kodritsch\, S. (2022). The bargaining trap. Games and Economic Behavior\, 136\, 249-254. \n6. Experiments \nBarron\, K.\, Ditlmann\, R.\, Gehrig\, S. & Schweighofer-Kodritsch\, S. (2025). Explicit and implicit belief-based gender discrimination: A hiring experiment. Management Science\, 71(2)\, 1600-1622. \nCamerer\, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press\, Chapters 1-5. \nRegistration\nPlease register for the course until November 30\, 2025 by sending an e-mail to cgde@iwh-halle.de.
URL:https://cgde-home.de/event/microeconomics-ii/2025-12-08/
LOCATION:Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association\, Leipziger Straße 100\, 06108 Halle (Saale)\, conference room\, 3rd floor\, Leipziger Strasse 100\, Halle (Saale)\, Saxony-Anhalt\, 06108\, Germany
CATEGORIES:First-Year Courses
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