Course type
IWH-DPE Foundation Course, CGDE First-year Course
Lecturer
Professor Dr Daniel Streitz (IWH and Friedrich Schiller University Jena)
Summary
This is the third course of the first-year triple sequence in Microeconomics.
This course provides students with a thorough understanding of two key frictions that are central to the financing of corporations as well as in many other economic settings: moral hazard and asymmetric information. The course will also cover the effects of (outside) monitoring on firms and the allocation of control rights across claim holders. The course will conclude with a discussion of macroeconomic implications, and, if time permits, a session on ESG.
Schedule
08.06.2026 10:30-12:00 and 13:00-15:30 IWH, Leipziger Str. 100, 3rd floor, Conference Room
22.06.2026 10:30-12:00 and 13:00-15:30 IWH, Leipziger Str. 100, 3rd floor, Conference Room
06.07.2026 10:30-12:00 and 13:00-15:30 IWH, Leipziger Str. 100, 3rd floor, Conference Room
Content
- An Economic Overview of Corporate Institutions
- Moral Hazard
- Asymmetric Information
- Monitoring and Control Rights
- Macroeconomic Implications
- Sustainable Finance
Course requirements
Attendance at all lectures is mandatory and a prerequisite to take the final exam.
Course completion requires passing of a written in-person exam.
Required Reading
1. An Economic Overview of Corporate Institutions
Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
2. Moral Hazard
Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapters 3 and 4.
3. Asymmetric Information
Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapter 6.
4. Monitoring and Control Rights
Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapters 8.1-8.2, 9.1-9.2 & 10.1-10.2.
5. Macroeconomic Implications
Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapters 13.1-13.3.
6. Sustainable Finance
Oehmke, M. & Opp, M. M. (2025). A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment. Review of Economic Studies, 92(2), 1193-1225.
(Optional) background on principal agent models
Laffont, J.-J. & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press.
Registration
Please register for the course until May 31, 2026 by sending an e-mail to cgde@iwh-halle.de.